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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of federal antitrust law is to promote and enforce the
national policy of unrestrained market competition.' State and local
governments, however, sometimes restrict competition in specific mar-
kets to facilitate improvement of the health and welfare of their resi-
dents. Furthermore, the principles of federalism allow states to
regulate local markets in response to matters of local concern.2 There-
fore, a legal tension exists between the competitive objectives of federal
antitrust law and the interests of state and local governments. This
article examines the extent to which federal antitrust laws must accom-
modate sovereign acts of states and their political subdivisions that re-
strict competition.
Congress did not intend antitrust laws to "restrain state action or
official action directed by a state."3 A state, however, may not avoid
the application of antitrust laws within its borders. Prudent implemen-
tation of state and local policies may require restriction or elimination
of competition in some markets. These conflicting interests manifest
themselves in the judicially created state action exemption, which
shields some state and local government anticompetitive conduct from
1. See Justice Douglas' dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 862
(1948).
2. See Wesehler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954).
3. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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antitrust law. Courts created the state action exemption to reconcile
the national policy of free competition with unique state and local
concerns.
Two recent Supreme Court cases clarified ambiguities in the applica-
tion of the state action exemption to antitrust enforcement. In Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire4 the Court refined application of the ex-
emption to anticompetitive municipal conduct. The Court held that
Eau Claire did not violate antitrust laws because Wisconsin statutes
clearly contemplated the challenged conduct. Furthermore, the Court
held that there is no absolute requirement that a state actively super-
vise or compel the challenged conduct for application of the exemption
to municipal conduct. In Southern Motor Carriers v. United States5 the
Court addressed application of the state action exemption to anticom-
petitive conduct allegedly authorized by state or local government.
The Court held the state action exemption applied to private conduct if
a state clearly articulates no intent to replace competition with active
supervision of the challenged conduct.6 Most significantly, the Court
held that a state need not "compel" the private conduct for the exemp-
tion to apply, but may merely "permit" it to occur.7
Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers are evaluated best in light of the
case law they succeed. Neither case significantly alters the state action
exemption, nor resolves all remaining uncertainties about its applica-
tion. The cases, however, refine the limits of the state action exemp-
tion. Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers, therefore, should lead to a
better understanding of when the state action exemption applies and,
thus, will facilitate state and municipal decisionmaking.
This article analyzes the state action exemption by examining the
case law to which it has given rise. The case law can be analyzed and
synthesized. This is not to suggest that the state action doctrine is nec-
essarily the best means to reconcile the Sherman Act and state sover-
eignty. The state action doctrine must nevertheless be appreciated for
the flexibility it brings to antitrust enforcement. The doctrine, as it
exists today, is capable of responding to changing market conditions
and policy considerations.
4. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
5. 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
6. Id. at 1728-29.
7. Id. at 1728.
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A. State Action Doctrine and the Midcal Test
Every antitrust state action question can be traced to the 1943
Parker v. Brown' decision in which the Supreme Court held exempt
from antitrust scrutiny a state raisin marketing program. The Califor-
nia Agricultural Prorate Act had directed state officials to establish
commodity marketing programs. State officials designed, with the aid
of raisin growers, the challenged program to control raisin supplies and
prices to protect California growers. The Court observed that had con-
certed private activity created the price setting scheme it would have
been per se illegal under the Sherman Act.9 Chief Justice Stone's
Parker opinion implies that state action may immunize conduct from
antitrust enforcement only when the state legislature in its sovereign
capacity authorized the challenged actions, and the specific program
challenged was adopted and enforced pursuant to legislative
authorization. 10
Parker established that a court's threshold inquiry should be
whether the state acted in its sovereign capacity to regulate independ-
ent entreprenurial activity. The Parker Court left unanswered an array
of perplexing issues. Are all acts of a state "sovereign?" May a state
delegate its authority to exempt to agencies or political subdivisions
such as municipalities? Under what circumstances can private parties
claim antitrust immunity? These issues remained relatively unlitigated
until a series of Supreme Court decisions brought the state action doc-
trine into the forefront of antitrust litigation.1" The Court did not ad-
vance a doctrinal formulation of the state action exemption until its
1980 opinion in California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum.12 The
Court stated that "[f]irst, the challenged restraint must be one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the pol-
icy must be actively supervised by the state itself."13
The Midcal test captures the essence of the state action exemption by
limiting its scope. The first part of the Midcal test examines whether a
8. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
9. Id. at 350.
10. See id. at 352.
11. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
12. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
13. IdL at 105.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/5
STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
state effectively used its power to exempt anticompetitive conduct. It
unequivocably requires that a state articulate a policy to displace com-
petition with regulation of a clearly bounded area of economic activity.
A state must authorize the challenged conduct with at least an infera-
ble intent to displace antitrust enforcement."4 This so called "authori-
zation requirement" applies to all categories of anticompetitive
conduct and all classes of defendants seeking protection through ex-
emption.15 In nearly all circumstances a state extends its sovereign au-
thorization to other parties through delegation of regulatory functions
to an agent of the state. 6 Hence, delegation is a necessary and logical
extension of part one of the Midcal test.
The second part of the Midcal test requires that a state maintain
actual regulatory oversight of the potentially anticompetitive conduct
of private parties. 7 This portion of the test ensures that private parties
do not collude with the state to exempt their conduct from antitrust
scrutiny. For the exemption to attach, the state alone must initiate the
act of authorization and oversee the regulated conduct. The supervi-
sion requirement is necessary to insulate private conduct from antitrust
scrutiny, but does not apply to municipalities vested with a public
purpose.
Judicial application of the Midcal test has generated confusion be-
cause of the failure to distinguish two distinct issues of ancillarity.
First, is the state's authorizing act necessarily ancillary to a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy, or an over-extension of that policy? Second, is
the challenged conduct of private parties reasonably ancillary to the
state's authorization, narrowly construed to attain the state's legitimate
purposes? These are especially difficult issues because the antitrust
claims factually vary on the following two dimensions: (1) the nature
of conduct challenged; and (2) the class of defendants asserting the
exemption. Issues of ancillarity may be more satisfactorily approached
by breaking the Midcal test into more discrete elements to crystallize
the proof requisite to establish the exemption. A more subtle and accu-
rate test for application of the state action doctrine might include the
following three questions:
14. See generally 1 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214 (1978) (a synthesis
of case law up to 1978).
15. See infra notes 70-78, 109-17 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
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(1) Did the state exercise its sovereign power to render private
conduct subject to regulation?
(2) When applicable, did a state regulatory agent exercise au-
thority within the limits of the state delegation to it and su-
pervise the challenged private conduct within the terms of
that delegation?
(3) Did the defendant act within the scope of that which the
state or its agent effectively authorized and enforced?
These questions narrow the application of the state action exemption
by requiring that each of the three affected parties-the state, the dele-
gated agent of the state and the private market actor-behave in ac-
cordance with strict limitations. These questions, obviously, are
intertwined: for example, to posit that a defendant acted outside the
scope of its authorization implicates the state's delegation of regulatory
authority as much as the defendant's market conduct. It is simplistic
and fallacious to consider these questions sequentially, as if they refer
to three discrete types of decisionmaking; instead, they are facets of one
complicated inquiry which must, in every case, be viewed in totality.
Municipal defendants present an additional array of unique
problems. A municipality often regulates the market conduct of others
as an agent of the state. In that capacity, a municipality is virtually
indistinguishable from a state agency. Application of the state action
exemption focuses on the specificity of the state's delegation of regula-
tory authority and examines whether the municipality's actions are be-
yond the scope of that delegation.18 Alternatively, a municipality may
be a market participant operating a public service enterprise. 9 In this
capacity, municipalities are analogous to private parties who may be
held accountable for antitrust violations. Application of the exemption
to municipal market activity requires examination of the peculiar sta-
tus of the municipal defendant to determine whether its conduct was
reasonable.
18. See, e.g., Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982) (broad state grant of home rule does not authorize a city to restrict cable televi-
sion market).
19. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985) (sewage
treatment); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(electric utility); Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985) (solid waste processing).
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II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR STATE USE OF THE
POWER TO EXEMPT
The Parker Court conditioned the state action exemption on the leg-
islative command of the state operating in its sovereign capacity. To
determine whether a state has effectively used its sovereign power,
courts examine (1) what, if any, limitations have been exceeded by the
state action, (2) what state apparatus has acted, and (3) what form the
state action has taken.
A. Limits State Power to Exempt
Even as the Parker Court invoked the state action exemption, it rec-
ognized that a state may not merely authorize or declare lawful an-
ticompetitive conduct, and thereby shield culpable acts from antitrust
enforcement.20 This limitation suggests that a state may not adopt a
policy to displace the antitrust laws, but may confer the exemption
only as to conduct that is ancillary to a legitimate state interest. Thus
in Parker, California's interest in conserving the agricultural wealth of
the state sufficiently legitimized the price regulation scheme. Califor-
nia did not override federal antitrust laws or deny their application
within the state; if it had, federal law, which establishes competition as
a fundamental economic value, would have preempted the state action.
A basic antitrust principle is that a contract that has an effect of
restraining trade is not a violation if merely ancillary to a legitimate
business transaction. In three decisions the Supreme Court adopted
the same logic to define partially the limits of a state's power to exempt
conduct from antitrust scrutiny.
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Brothers v.
Calvert Distillers Corp.2 Interstate resale price fixing is per se illegal
under the Sherman Act,2" however, the Miller-Tydings Act exempted
from coverage resale price contracts if lawful under state fair trade
laws.23 Louisiana law provided for enforcement of contractually fixed
prices against signatory and nonsignatory retailers. Many Louisiana
liquor retailers entered price fixing contracts with the plaintiff liquor
distributors to fix minimum prices of plaintiffs' products. The plaintiffs
20. 317 U.S. at 351.
21. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
23. Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982) (an amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
1985]
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then sued Schwegmann Brothers, a nonsignatory retailer, for cutting
prices on their products. The district court enjoined Schwegmann
Brothers' price cutting, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Miller-Tyd-
ings Act exempts from the Sherman Act only price agreements for arti-
cles purchased by contracting retailers.24 The Court concluded that
the State of Louisiana's compulsory price fixing scheme impermissably
exceeded the Miller-Tydings Act's limited tolerance of voluntary pri-
vate contractual price fixing.25
Thirteen years after Schwegman, the Supreme Court ruled, in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,26 that an Illinois unfair competition law
could not be used to enjoin a seller of lamps from copying unpatentable
designs of another. The Court posited that the patent provision of the
Constitution27 is strictly limited and that a patent monopoly may not
be used in disregard of antitrust laws. The Court noted that, under the
supremacy clause, a state may not exceed federal patent protection pro-
visions in a manner that disturbs the federal balance between free com-
petition and promoting inventions.2" Schwegman and Stiffel stood for
the proposition that the preemption doctrine prohibits state attempts to
bar enforcement of federal antitrust laws. Without such limits the
Parker state action exemption would swallow antitrust law. In essence,
a state may use its power to regulate commerce in a manner that con-
tains competitive market conduct in accordance with legitimate state
interests, but a state may not legalize anticompetitive processes per se
and thereby preempt antitrust laws.
More complex considerations arise when there is potential conflict
between the preemption doctrine and the antitrust state action exemp-
tions. In this regard consider the recent decision of Rice v. Norman
Williams Co.,29 in which the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohib-
iting liquor importers from accepting delivery unless the transporter is
designated as an authorized agent of the distiller. Liquor importers
claimed that the Sherman Act preempted the California statute. The
California Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitutional because it
gave distillers unfettered power to restrain competition at the distribu-
24. Schwegman Brothers, 341 U.S. at 387.
25. Id.
26. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. 376 U.S. at 230-31.
29. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
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tion level. 30 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court
stated that state laws are not preempted by federal antitrust laws unless
there is an irreconcilable facial conflict.3' A conflict between state reg-
ulatory schemes and federal antitrust law that is not compelled but
merely potential, is inadequate to support a holding of preemption.32
Rice, therefore, establishes a boundary for the analysis developed in
Schwegman and Stiffel by recognizing a fundamental distinction be-
tween a legitimate state regulatory policy which merely implicates
competitive conduct from a state effort to limit the reach of federal
law.33 The test of legality of state regulatory efforts is whether the
restraint imposed merely regulates, or is preempted because it directly
suppresses antitrust enforcement. This distinction would seem to be
the only way to maintain the state action exemption within recogniza-
ble bounds.
B. Which Governmental Branches May Act in a Sovereign Capacity
In most instances, a state exercises its power to exempt through leg-
islative enactment of laws regulating commercial activity. State judi-
cial and executive branches, however, may also act for a state in a
manner that is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. If the state itself is
accused of anticompetitive conduct, no other state action need be al-
leged to claim antitrust exemption.34
30. Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1980).
31. Rice, 458 U.S. at 659, 661.
32. Id.
33. It is a fundamental limitation on the application of the state action exemption
that there be conflict between state-authorized actions and federal antitrust law. If
there is no conflict, then either state law is irrelevant to the evaluation of the conduct's
antitrust culpability, or the challenged conduct is not culpable. Thus, in Battipaglia v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1393 (1985), a state law requiring that liquor producers and wholesalers publish prices
and maintain those prices for 30 days was held not to conflict with the Sherman Act
because wholesalers and retailers could obey the law without conspiring to fix prices.
Similarly, in Grendel's Den v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1981), afl'd, 459 U.S. 116
(1982), plaintiff applicant for a liquor license claimed that a Massachusetts statute
granting churches and schools veto power over the licensing of liquor-serving establish-
ments enabled the Holy Cross Church to use its veto power to exclude plaintiff on
behalf of competing restauranteurs. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the state action exemption did not apply because there was no showing Massachu-
setts intended to "authorize and effectuate" the alleged private conspiracy. 662 F.2d at
100.
34. See New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974), in
which the court held that state legislation is not necessary to claim the state action
1985]
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A series of Supreme Court cases has considered claims that a state's
highest court can exercise the state power to exempt. In Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,3 the Supreme Court held that the Virginia State
Bar had no authority, absent legislative action, to fix and enforce mini-
mum legal fee schedules. The Virginia legislature authorized the state
supreme court to regulate the practice of law, thus relegating the state
bar, an official state agency, to administer court adopted rules and reg-
ulations. Pursuant to its authority, the supreme court adopted ethical
canons and went on record directing attorneys not to be controlled by
fee schedules. The Virginia State Bar, however, enforced a minimum
fee schedule, adopted by a county bar association, through disciplinary
proceedings and issuance of ethical opinions. The plaintiffs, unable to
secure the services of an attorney for less than the schedule minimum,
challenged the schedule as illegal price fixing. The State Bar justified
its acts as those of a state agency implementing ethical codes adopted
by the Virginia Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court
characterized the State Bar as a state agency with limited authority
which did not "create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster an-
ticompetitive practices" of its members.3 6 In short, the State Bar uni-
laterally fixed prices without legislative or judicial authorization and
therefore did not act for the state in a manner exempt from antitrust
laws.
In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,3 7
upheld Arizona Bar Association enforcement of disciplinary rules
promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court that imposed restraints on
lawyer advertising. The plaintiff attorneys claimed that the Bar Asso-
ciation restrained legal competition by invoking the rules against ad-
vertising. The Court identified the central issue as the rulemaking
authority of the Arizona Supreme Court, not rule enforcement by the
State Bar. Because the Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking powers
derived from the state constitution, the Court concluded that the rules
"clearly and affirmatively" expressed the state's policy toward profes-
sional behavior of attorneys.3" A legislative mandate, therefore, is un-
exemption when the state itself is the defendant. The court stated that legislative action
is only one means of establishing state responsibility for an anticompetitive scheme. On
that basis, the court dismissed a counterclaim against the state that it participated in a
conspiracy to fix the price of asphalt.
35. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
36. Id. at 791.
37. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
38. Id. at 362.
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necessary when a state constitution expressly grants rulemaking power
to a state's highest court, and that court functions within the scope of
the constitutional grant of authority. 9
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Hoover v. Ronwin, 40 followed
Bates and reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that denied the state action
exemption. 4 An unsuccessful applicant for admission to the Arizona
Bar alleged that the state bar examination committee controlled the
supply of attorneys by setting passing scores without reference to basic
competence. 42 The Court found that the Arizona Constitution granted
the Arizona Supreme Court the power to make final determinations on
admission to the bar.43 The Court also asserted that the state supreme
court formulated bar exam rules and standards in a legislative capacity,
advised by the state bar examination committee. Thus, a state supreme
court could exercise a state's sovereign power to exempt if it derived its
authority from the state constitution and if it acted in a legislative
capacity."
The post-Goldfarb cases unanimously find that a state properly exer-
cised its power to exempt, even though the legislature did not directly
authorize the state action. The unifying concept is that a state supreme
court is exempt from antitrust scrutiny if, as a coequal branch of gov-
ernment empowered by a state constitution, it affirmatively expresses
an intent to regulate challenged conduct. Goldfarb, therefore, does not
limit state supreme court power, but rather addresses undelegated con-
duct of a state bar association.
The Ninth Circuit recently followed Bates and Ronwin to hold that
39. Accord Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
41, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. Had the Ninth Circuit not found that state action did not apply, it is unlikely
that the Ron win dispute would have reached a jury much less the Supreme Court. The
plaintiff's complaint alleging conspiracy on the part of the state bar to restrain trade by
raising barriers to entry might well have been dismissed on substantive grounds. Prov-
ing that state-regulated, uniformly applied standards for entry to professional practice
may constitute culpable exclusion would require improbable proof that the standards
were unreasonably anticompetitive.
43. 104 S. Ct. at 1997-98.
44. Id. at 1995. See also Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
vacated in part on other grounds, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (rules restricting admission to the
bar to persons who had graduated from American Bar Association accredited law
schools were exempt since the court of appeals was the final governmental body exercis-
ing control over admission to the District of Columbia bar and, therefore, had acted in a
sovereign capacity).
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the state executive branch may exercise the power to exempt when it
acts in a legislative capacity. In Deak-Perero Hawaii, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation,45 the operator of the currency exchange at
Honolulu International Airport challenged the Hawaii Department of
Transportation's grant of an exclusive five year concession to a compet-
itor. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirming the dismis-
sal of the complaint on state action grounds, stated that the executive
branch was a coequal under Hawaii State Constitution provisions and
that the Department was a duly constituted division of the executive.46
Deak-Perero extends Bates and Ronwin, suggesting that a state exec-
utive agency can exercise the power to exempt even when not acting in
a legislative capacity.47 This analysis emphasizes that determination of
what entities constitute the "state" requires a court to inquire into
what specific conduct is alleged to have been exempted by the entity.
Though federal courts do not deny the limited sovereignty of state judi-
cial and executive branches, state action requires more than the mere
presence of a branch of state government.
C. How States Must Act to Execute the Exemption
Virtually every decision since Parker has required that the chal-
lenged act be within the ambit of an affirmatively expressed and clearly
articulated state policy. This requirement responds to the concern that
private market participants may attempt to masquerade their anticom-
petitive conduct as sovereign acts of a state. The Supreme Court's
Goldfarb decision requires anticompetitive conduct to be "compelled,"
not merely "prompted" by a sovereign act of a state.48 Similarly, in
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.49 the Court held that a private utility's
program to provide light bulbs to consumers at no cost lacked sufficient
state involvement to warrant exemption. Although the Michigan Pub-
45. 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1756 (1985).
46. 745 F.2d at 1283.
47. See also Ajax Aluminum, Inc. v. Goodwill Industries, 564 F. Supp. 628 (W.D.
Mich. 1983), in which the court held a low income weatherization program adminis-
tered by the State Department of Labor automatically exempt. The court held that acts
of the Department were sovereign acts of the state in view of statutory authority grant-
ing the Department control of the program. 1d. at 633. Because the Department acted
for the state, the court did not consider whether the state legislature authorized the
challenged conduct. Id.
48. 421 U.S. 773, 791.




lic Utilities Commission approved the utility's tariff, which included
the cost of the bulbs, the utility, not the state, initiated the tariff ap-
proval process. The Court stated that mere "state authorization, ap-
proval, encouragement, or participation" in private anticompetitive
conduct does not merit antitrust immunity.50
Goldfarb and Cantor suggest that a state may effectively exercise its
power to exempt only by compelling conduct under threat of legal pun-
ishment. Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, indicate state
compulsion of the challenged anticompetitive conduct is not required
for the exemption to apply. In New Motor Vehicle Board of California
v. Orrin W Fox Co., for example, the Court held that a state statute
establishing a comprehensive regulatory regime exempted defendants'
conduct even though the statute did not compel the challenged act.
The California Automobile Franchise Act52 provided that automobile
manufacturers must secure the approval of the state Motor Vehicle
Board prior to opening a new franchise or relocating an existing
franchise when an existing franchisee within the same territory com-
plained of undue competition. Plaintiffs, prospective franchisees, chal-
lenged the scheme on the grounds that the delay in establishing
franchises permitted privately initiated market restraints. The Court,
without rigorously distinguishing Goldfarb and Cantor, held that the
California Act was exempt because it "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed" a state scheme to restrain the establishment and relo-
cation of automotive dealerships.
53
Four years later, in Community Communication Co. v. City of Boul-
der,54 the Court held that the "clear articulation and affirmative ex-
pression" requirement is not met by mere state "neutrality" toward
anticompetitive acts of municipalities.5 5
In Southern Motor Carriers, the United States challenged joint rate
proposals filed on behalf of competing motor carriers with four state
50. Id at 592-93 (citations omitted). The Court, however, assumed that it would
always be improper to extend liability to a party compelled by state authority to do the
challenged acts. Id at 592.
51. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
52. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3062-63 (West Supp. 1978).
53. Orrin W. Fox Ca, 439 U.S. at 109.
54. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
55. Id at 55. See also Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. I11. 1981)
(sham redevelopment plan not compelled by state statutes which permit municipal
redevelopment).
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Public Service Commissions. In response to the claim that such collec-
tive ratemaking constituted price fixing, the defendant carriers con-
tended that the state action doctrine immunized their activity. The
district court entered summary judgment for the government, finding
that the states permitted, but did not compel, the challenged conduct.
5 6
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that compulsion is a threshold re-
quirement to a finding of state action immunity.57 Four dissenting
judges argued that even in the absence of compulsion, the challenged
activity may be a legitimate response to flexible state regulatory
programs.
58
The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that states must have a free
choice to adopt policies that permit, but do not compel, private party
anticompetitive conduct.59 The Court held that Midcal's two-pronged
test 60 applies to private claims of state action immunity and required
proof of a clearly articulated state policy to displace private competi-
tion with regulation. 6' The Court indicated that state compulsion is
merely sufficient, but not necessary evidence of such a state policy.
62
The Court stated that a requirement of state compulsion conflicts with
federalism principles by restricting excessively state regulatory alterna-
tives. 63 Furthermore, the Court stated that if other evidence conclu-
sively showed a state intention to adopt a permissive regulatory
approach, the absence of state compulsion "should not prove fatal to a
claim of Parker immunity." 6 In his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice White, argued that courts disfavor exemptions to the Sherman
Act and that price fixing among competing carriers substantially tam-
pered with the impersonal forces of the competitive marketplace.65
Properly confined, the majority's opinion does not raise the concerns
addressed by Justice Stevens. The Court does not hint that private par-
56. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
471 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
57. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. 1983).
58. Id. at 546.
59. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct.
1721, 1731-32 (1985).
60. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Midcal.
61. Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1728-29.
62. Id. at 1729.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1730.
65. Id. at 1737.
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ties charged with price fixing may claim state authorization because of
a vague or ambiguous or neutral state policy. Indeed, the Southern
Motor Carriers opinion neither raises nor lowers Midcal's threshold
requirement of a clearly articulated state policy beyond that established
by prior litigation." The question presented should be viewed nar-
rowly: may clearly articulated "permission" immunize private con-
duct undertaken within the scope of that articulation? That the answer
is affirmative does not widen the coverage of the state action exemp-
tion; private parties must still demonstrate that their conduct was au-
thorized properly. Thus, the concern that the exemption may expand
beyond its intended limitations is addressed better by emphasizing state
delegation of authority to regulate, rather than overstating the signifi-
cance of compulsion as an independent requirement.
III. DELEGATION AND AUTHORIZATION
A. Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundations
Nonstate parties asserting the state action exemption to shield chal-
lenged conduct from antitrust scrutiny must establish that, in addition
to state action, there is an essential relationship between the state ac-
tion and the defendant's challenged conduct. The terms "delegation"
and "authorization" define that link. "Delegation" refers to the extent
to which the state deputized a subsidiary or agent to exercise the power
to exempt. "Authorization" pertains to the next segment of the same
relationship by examining whether the defendant's conduct is within
the specified limitations of the state's exercise of its power to exempt.
These terms are not clearly separable. In some cases, the defendant's
authority, valid or not, derives directly from the legislature itself, and
thus the issues of delegation and authorization are identical. In other
situations, the defendant's authority derives from the act of a state
agent, who in turn traces its power back to the legislature, making the
issues of delegation and authorization distinctly sequential. In many
cases, although a state agency is an intermediate between the state and
the regulated entity, the issues of delegation and authorization over-
lap-a problem made especially troublesome by the judiciary's appar-
ent refusal to clarify terminology or doctrine.
66. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985); Scott v. Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985); Central Iowa Refuse Sys. v. Des Moines, 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700
F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), affld, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
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Courts tend, perhaps unavoidably, to consider the status of the de-
fendant as either a private party or municipality as the key to the dele-
gation and authorization issues. Accordingly, a municipality that acts
pursuant to a governing statute may be said to be authorized to so act,
and such authorization is distinguishable from a license received by a
private business from a regulatory commission. This is a useful distinc-
tion, but it is difficult to apply to a municipally-owned private utility
that is a market participant, or a wholly unregulated firm that receives
authorization for allegedly anticompetitive activity directly from a mu-
nicipality. The variable nature of intermediaries in the chain of delega-
tion and authorization, plus the often multiple roles municipalities
play, renders elusive the analysis of the defendant's status.
Another troublesome approach is to focus on the nature of defend-
ant's conduct as determinant. Conduct that would, in the absence of
state regulation, be deemed per se illegal, therefore, may require more
explicit delegation and authorization to be exempt than conduct
deemed subject to the rule of reason. Parker held exempt horizontal
price fixing-the most "per se" illegal of all antitrust offenses. Given
the evolving nature of substantive antitrust prohibitions, a criteria for
the state action exemption premised on the conduct's per se characteri-
zation would be, at best, completely unpredictable.
Irrationally, courts are also predisposed to weigh the appropriate-
ness of antitrust enforcement against the touted benefits that the de-
fendant's challenged conduct offers to the state regulatory scheme. A
balancing process evades the complex delegation and authorization is-
sues by reopening settled disputes as to whether competition is a pre-
eminent economic value. Judicial inquiry into whether the conduct
sought to be protected was more or less beneficial to the state's regula-
tory interests than freely competitive conduct undercuts antitrust doc-
trine and enforcement because the court substitutes its own economic
values for those established by Congress.
Courts should resist all of these tendencies and opt for an analysis
focusing on delegation and authorization as a bequest of a limited sov-
ereign power that can be narrowed but never broadened as it is handed
down. The court's function in performing such an analysis is purely
legal: to determine as a matter of law whether the state's exercise of
limited power is reasonably related to the defendant's conduct. This is




The landmark case in this area is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.67 A
light bulb retailer challenged defendant utility's program of furnishing
light bulbs to residential customers free of additional charge (the costs
of the program were part of the utility's operating costs and passed
along through its rates). The plaintiff claimed that the defendant used
its lawfully acquired monopoly power in electricity distribution to re-
strain the retail light bulb trade. Defendant showed that this market-
ing practice had been in effect for nearly ninety years and had been
approved, as part of defendants' tariffs, by the Michigan Public Utili-
ties Commission for over fifty years. Furthermore, the defendant could
not terminate the program without Commission approval of a modified
tariff. The district court granted summary judgment for the utility,
holding that the Parker state action exemption applied for three rea-
sons. First, the state empowered the Commission to regulate utilities.
Second, the Commission authorized the challenged program. Last, the
state compelled the program because the defendant could not end the
program without Commission approval. 6' The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed.69 In a plurality opinion the Supreme Court reversed. °
The Court held that neither Commission approval of the Utility's
tariff nor the need for Commission approval to end the light bulb pro-
gram were sufficient to find state action to justify exemption of the pro-
gram from federal antitrust laws. 1 Justice Blackmun's concurrence
explored the Sherman Act's effect upon the Michigan Commission's
approval of the light bulb program. He rejected as overly simplistic
three approaches: (1) a focus on whether the state requires, rather than
merely authorizes, anticompetitive conduct; (2) a focus on whether pri-
vate actors or the state initiated the anticompetitive scheme; and (3) a
focus on the degree of affirmative articulation by the state. 2 Instead,
he urged a rule of reason inquiry, which recognized that "state sanc-
tion figures powerfully in the calculus" especially where the state "reg-
ulates private activity to the same ends sought to be achieved by the
67. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
68. 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
69. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) (mem).
70. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion in which Jus-
tices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined; Chief Justice Burger joined in two parts of
the Stevens' opinion and in the judgment; Justice Blackmun concurring in the judg-
ment, filed a separate opinion; Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Powell,
dissented.
71. 428 U.S. at 598.
72. It at 609-10.
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Sherman Act."7 3 Assessing the justifications for the challenged light
bulb program, Justice Blackmun stated that blocking competition in
the light bulb market was an impermissible state objective for a state
action antitrust exemption unless it could be shown existing competi-
tion was ineffective.74 The facts of the case demonstrated that the light
bulb market was not inherently unstable, a natural monopoly or detri-
mental to the health and safety of Michigan residents.75
If the Court had affirmed the exemption in Cantor, it would have
upheld the act of a regulatory agency without regard to the scope of
the state's policy in subjecting private utilities to regulation. Such an
approach would imply that a state agency possesses an open-ended
power to exempt based solely upon a general delegation of regulatory
authority. The Court's rejection of that approach demonstrates that
anticompetitive conduct that is not ancillary to a state's legitimate pur-
pose in regulating a marketplace may be invalidated even though the
state affirmatively expresses a policy to displace unfettered business
freedom. Justice Blackmun substantially clarified the matter by con-
cluding that the Michigan Commission's approval of the program was
not within the scope of the state's interest in regulating utilities. In this
respect, Justice Blackmun attempted to bring the state action inquiry
into line with the fundamental principles of antitrust law, which, under
the rule of reason, sanction the adoption of only the lease restrictive
restraints of trade are also necessarily ancillary to a legitimate regula-
tory scheme of market organization.
B. Scope and Specificity
The terms "scope" and "specificity" merit careful analysis.
Although the terms are not mutually exclusive, and neither term limits
the state's effective delegation of the power to exempt, they refer to
different inquiries. To determine whether a state agent authorized con-
duct within the scope of its delegated power, a court must ask if the
authorized conduct was wholly within the confines of the state regula-
tory scheme as contemplated by the legislature's enabling act. Thus, a
"scope" problem may arise when a regulatory agent exceeds its dele-
gated function by authorizing conduct outside of those confines, or
when a private market participant engages in conduct that is not au-
73. Id. at 611.
74. Id. at 612-13.
75. Id. at 613.
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thorized entirely by the delegated agent. The term "specificity" is re-
lated closely to scope, but focuses on whether the legislature
specifically contemplated the particular activity in question. As a gen-
eral matter, conduct that is reasonably ancillary to the accomplishment
of legitimate state interests may be assumed to be legislatively contem-
plated, but more exceptional behavior requires a more specific statu-
tory command.16 "Scope" and "specificity" are interacting elements of
a unified analysis in that "scope" refers to the breadth of authorization
to establish outer limits of permissible activity, while "specificity" per-
tains to whether the allegedly authorized activity is sufficiently narrow
to support an inference that it was reasonably contemplated by the leg-
islature. Regardless of which term is used, the threshold inquiry is
constant: can a traceable and confinable link be established between a
legitimate act of state and the defendant's conduct such that it can be
inferred that the challenged conduct was, in its entirety, the reasonable
consequence of the state's policy to displace unfettered business free-
dom with regulation."
As a starting point in the analysis, it must be recognized that while a
state agency may possess the authority to act in a given area, it does
not necessarily follow that all its actions are exempt. Consider some of
the important applications of this principle in recent years. In its sim-
76. See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 435, 447 (1981).
77. Consider the meaning of the terms "scope" and "specificity" in the case of
Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 712 (D.
Hawaii 1981), in which a taxi operator challenged a 15-year exclusive contract between
a State of Hawaii-managed airport and an association of independent taxi owners
(SIDA) as an unreasonable foreclosure of competition. The state defendant and SIDA
moved to dismiss claiming that, under Midcal, their conduct was exempt as state action.
The district court denied the motion finding that state statutes permitted Hawaii,
through its Department of Transportation, to enter into contracts to operate the airport.
The broad grant of authority, however, was insufficient to insulate the award of a 15-
year exclusive contract. The court stated that neither the statutory scheme, nor its
legislative history, suggested a "clear legislative intent" to replace competition with
state regulation of taxi service. The court concluded that, at best, the legislation indi-
cated state acquiescence to decisions by the Department of Transportation and the air-
port manager. Id. at 712. See also Springs Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Mirage, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,646 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd in part, 745 F.2d
1270 (1984). In Springs the court held that the alleged refusal by the city to refer ambu-
lance calls to the plaintiff, conspiracy to fix ambulance rates, and predatory pricing were
not immune from antitrust enforcement. The court held that though the city acted
pursuant to a clearly articulated and actively supervised policy, which envisioned dis-
placement of competition, the state did not envision the specific acts complained of.
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,646 at 69,284 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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plest manifestation, "scope" may be appreciated as a relevant variable
in Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Au-
thority,7 8 and in Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Au-
thority.7 9 In each case, defendant PRMSA asserted that it was a
government agency created by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
1974 to operate Puerto Rico's maritime transportation system as a
public service. In each case, defendant pointed to the explicit legisla-
tive intent to exempt PRMSA from antitrust enforcement.80 In both
cases, the plaintiffs challenged PRMSA acquisition of shipping lines
and reaching operating and lease agreements-a function specifically
provided for by its enabling legislation. The plaintiffs in Caribe alleged
that firms involved in formation and operation of PRMSA conspired to
monopolize shipping between Puerto Rico and the United States'
mainland. Plaintiffs claimed the defendants illegally excluded them
from the Caribbean shipping trade. The Puerto Rico legislature, how-
ever, specifically had instructed PRMSA to take over and operate
freight and passenger shipping between the island and the United
States. The court held that the actions of PRMSA and private firms
involved with it were immune from antitrust liability as state action.8 '
In contrast, plaintiffs in Star alleged that by terminating Star's ser-
vice contract, PRMSA entered into a conspiracy to exclude Star from
the vessel servicing market in the East Coast-Persian Gulf trade. After
a lengthy review of Supreme Court precedent, the district court held
that the state action doctrine did not apply to PRMSA's challenged
activities."2 Puerto Rico established PRMSA and granted it an express
antitrust exemption to facilitate stabilization of shipping between Pu-
erto Rico and the mainland. The plaintiff's challenges bore no relation-
ship to shipping that served Puerto Rico. The court therefore stated
that the relationship between the legislative grant of power and the
challenged conduct was "too tenuous" to conclude the conduct was
78. 475 F. Supp. 711 (D.D.C. 1979).
79. 451 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
80. Act of Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, Act No. 62 (1974) states:
The legislature of Puerto Rico intends that [PRMSA] acquires and operates ship-
ping lines and terminal facilities as a public service, and that in doing so, it shall
not be subject to the antitrust laws nor any other limitation that could hinder the
effective discharge of the endeavor that this act has imposed on [PRMSA].
Id.
81. Caribe, 475 F. Supp. at 724-25.
82. Star, 451 F. Supp. at 166.
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within the "intended scope" of the legislation.8 3 Star is distinguishable
from Caribe solely because the scope of Puerto Rico's policy was lim-
ited to the Caribbean. Therefore, identical conduct by one party could
be exempt within the boundary, but not exempt if outside the territory
of the state's delegation of authority.
The PRMSA cases give some dimension to the term "scope." With
regard to the term "specificity," contrast two decisions rendered by the
same court pertaining to the conduct of the same defendant, but with
different results: Llewellyn v. Crothers,84 and Phillips v. Crothers.85 In
Llewellyn the court held that the medical director of a state workman's
compensation department was immune from antitrust liability under a
so-called "good faith doctrine." Chiropractors alleged that the defend-
ant erroneously applied a state workman's compensation statute to fix
low chiropractor reimbursement rates. The district court found that
the statute authorized the director to stabilize and control workers'
compensation costs, though no statute specifically empowered him to
set the challenged fee schedule. The court then considered whether a
properly delegated official acting pursuant to state policy may lose anti-
trust immunity because of a defective execution of that authority. The
court held that the director did not act outside the scope of his author-
ity. Even if his motives were hostile to chiropractors, to deny immu-
nity would create an incentive for aggrieved parties to ignore the state-
supervised regulatory mechanism and seek redress only in federal anti-
trust courts-an intolerable consequence according to principles of
federalism.
In Phillips, the district court declined to exempt the medical direc-
tor's refusal to authorize injured workers to seek treatment from plain-
tiff chiropractor. Though the defendant pointed to numerous state
statutes empowering him to regulate workers' compensation, the court
found that the statutes did not specifically direct the defendant to bar
treatment of injured workers by a particular doctor.86 The court stated
that to invoke the state action exemption there must be a "very close
nexus" between the challenged anticompetitive conduct and the statute
83. Star, 451 F. Supp. at 167 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
84. 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,358 (D. Or. 1983), affld, 765 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1985).
85. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,667 (D. Or. 1982).
86. See id.
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"allegedly compelling that conduct.",1
7
It is difficult to distinguish the holdings of Caribe and Star or the
holdings of Phillips and Llewellyn, and without an appreciation of the
concepts of scope and specificity this task would be impossible. These
decisions, collectively, reinforce the principle that a court will deny an
exemption if the challenged act is not specifically contemplated and
within the confines of the actual delegation of authority. Unfortu-
nately, courts manipulate these concepts without clearly stating why
they decide similar factual disputes differently. Indeed, a more thor-
ough investigation of case law demonstrates that courts employ these
concepts selectively according to the particular nature of the chal-
lenged conduct.
C. Authorization of Private Conduct: Associational and Other
Horizontal Restraints
Professional associations are often antitrust defendants because of
their efforts to limit entry into a profession or maintain standards of
competence and ethical conduct. If these efforts are without any gov-
ernmental imprimatur, then naturally no exemption applies, and re-
strictions are judged by the rule of reason. Professional associations,
however, are usually subject to some form of state regulation that au-
thorizes the associations to self-regulate aspects of their market. This
section does not explore whether an association has received proper
delegation to restrict the market pursuant to a legitimate state pur-
pose,8" but rather explores whether the association's challenged con-
duct is within the scope of its authority and specifically contemplated
by the state.
Consider the Sixth Circuit's decision in Gambrel v. Kentucky Board
of Dentistry,9 in which a dental technician challenged a restriction
promulgated by the Kentucky Board of Dentistry that prevented pa-
tients from choosing among denture makers. The Board required that
prescriptions and orders for dental work be sent to a laboratory chosen
by dentists. The defendants claimed that legislative policy placed the
87. Id. See also Health Care Equalization Comm'n of the Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y
v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Iowa 1980), in which the court denied
immunity to an agency official for conspiring with medical doctors to boycott chiro-
practors. The court found the agency itself exempt on the basis of interpretation of the
state statute by the governor and attorney general.
88. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
89. 689 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983).
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responsibility for the treatment and fitting of patients for dentures ex-
clusively upon a licensed dentist and cited a Kentucky law that prohib-
ited dental technicians from providing dental work "to any person
other than a licensed dentist."'  The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for the Board of Dentistry, and held that the state statutory
scheme clearly articulated an intent to compel the challenged actions.91
The Sixth Circuit's decision is subject to criticism that the plain
meaning of the Kentucky statute simply does not specify, compel or
even suggest the restraint under challenge. At the very least, it is un-
fortunate that the court made no explicit attempt to connect the
Board's tie-in restriction to Kentucky's legitimate interests in regulat-
ing dental care. Instead, the court placed great weight on the Board's
statutory interpretation, which appears to be a circular application of
the state action exemption. Nevertheless, the Gambrel opinion is
clearly consistent with the approach taken by courts in at least three
circuits. Thus, in Princeton Community Phonebook, Inc. v. Bate,92 the
Third Circuit held that a restriction on legal advertising in the yellow
pages was exempt from the Sherman Act as state action. The Advisory
Committee on Professional Ethics of the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the restriction pursuant to a demonstrable state policy to regti-
late legal advertising. The Court stated that New Jersey "need not
have contemplated the precise action complained of,"93 it being suffi-
cient that there was a "close relationship" between the state and the
Committee and that the Committee exercised the state's sovereign
power as an agent of the State Supreme Court.9 4
Similarly, in Benson v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners,9"
the Ninth Circuit applied the state action doctrine to reject claims that
the Board illegally restricted entry into the dental profession. Arizona
statutes conferred upon the Board authority to regulate dental practice
and entry into the profession. Dentists licensed outside of Arizona
challenged the state requirement that only dentists who pass the Ari-
zona dental exam may obtain a license for unrestricted practice within
90. Ky. REv. STAT. § 313.010(2) (1981).
91. 689 F.2d at 717.
92. 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
93. 582 F.2d at 717.
94. Id. at 719.
95. 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the state.9 6 The court rejected as a conclusory allegation the plaintiffs'
contention that the Board acted outside the scope of its legislative man-
date. Most recently, in Brazil v. Arkansas Board of Dental Examin-
ers,97 a district court exempted the Board of Dental Examiners'
adoption and enforcement of allegedly restrictive professional entry re-
quirements. The court concluded that the Arkansas General Assembly
clearly authorized the Board to regulate dental practice within the state
with an intent to displace competition.
The cases holding exempt state commission authorized restrictions
on professional practice entry are consistent with a line of cases hold-
ing that commission approved fee schedules and market divisions are
also exempt from antitrust laws. Courts in the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits have immunized purely private market restraints on the grounds
that state commissions properly exercised their authority to regulate.
Thus, in Horseman's Benevolent and Protective Association v. Penn-
sylvania Horseracing Commission98 the court held that a Commission
rule setting jockey fees was exempt as state action even though the
legislature specifically did not grant the Commission power to fix fees.
The court noted that legislative bodies, out of necessity, grant broad
regulatory powers to state administrative agencies that cannot be con-
sidered per se invalid as lacking specificity.99 An unambiguous holding
of the state supreme court that jockey fee setting was within the regula-
tory powers conferred on the Commission by state statute supported
the court's state action holding.
Similarly, in Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs,1o the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected a racetrack owner's claim that a date allocation provision
in its lease with a track operator was an illegal horizontal market divi-
sion. The lease agreement resulted from negotiations between plaintiff
and defendant, which were supervised by the Arizona Racing Commis-
sion acting pursuant to its statutory authority. Plaintiff admitted that
the legislature evinced a policy limiting the number of racing days, but
argued that such limitations do not shield a combination of private
96. The state allowed nonresident licensed dentists to practice as unsalaried employ-
ees of charitable organizations.
97. 593 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
98. 530 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd rem., 688 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1984).
Accord Euster v. Eagle Downs, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022
(1982).
99. See 530 F. Supp. at 1107.
100. 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982).
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parties to allocate those days. Furthermore, plaintiff argued that in
view of Cantor,101 the Commission's acquiescence in the market divi-
sion defeated the exemption. The Ninth Circuit rejected these argu-
ments, finding that "it was the stated policy of the Arizona Legislature
that conflicts in dates be settled by the private parties and not by the
Commission." '
These associational restraint decisions applied the state action ex-
emption even though the connection between the state regulatory pol-
icy and the challenged conduct was less than compelling. The
unanimity of these decisions is striking in view of the disparate state
action case law. In some of the cases, it is at least arguable that the
challenged restraint was neither compelled by the clear meaning of the
state statute nor narrowly ancillary to the necessary accomplishment of
a legitimate state purpose. These cases, therefore, create an inference
that the judiciary is especially deferential to actions of state commis-
sions that authorize private parties to adopt and obey horizontal re-
straints on competition. When these decisions are read with Bates v.
State Board ofArizonal°3 and Hoover v. Ronwin, ° it is clear that asso-
ciational restraints are exempt if they bear the minimum of state
imprimatur.
D. Authorization of Private Conduct-Natural Monopolies
In stark contrast to the cases considered in the previous section,
courts almost unanimously decline to exempt conduct of regulated util-
ities as state action. Consider the series of cases in which the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) asserted the state action
exemption to bar antitrust scrutiny of its efforts to prohibit intercon-
nections with competing terminal equipment. In most cases, the court
rejected application of the exemption."0 5 In Sound, Inc. v. American
101. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
102. 670 F.2d at 824.
103. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
104. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984). See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
105. Sound, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Essential
Communications Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979);
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Intercon-
nect Planning Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 465 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But
cf Capital Tel. Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2325 (1985) (state intended to displace competition with regulation in the
markets for radio telephones and paging systems).
1985]
Washington University Open Scholarship
108 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:83
Telephone and Telegraph Co.," 6 the Eighth Circuit held that state au-
thorization of proposed rates did not exempt the utility from charges of
conspiracy to exclude a competing equipment manufacturer from the
market through predatory pricing. Emphasizing the limited nature of
the agency action, the court discounted AT&T's supporting argument
that the Iowa State Commerce Commission had approved its prices for
terminal equipment in a process that included antitrust considerations.
The court applied its expanded interpretation of the Midcal test"°7 to
hold that utility rate approval does not constitute a "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy" to restrain the terminal tele-
phone equipment market.
Other decisions involving AT&T tend to focus on the lack of state
compulsion of the challenged activity. Thus, the district court, in Lit-
ton Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,108 cited
Cantor in holding that the state action exemption "extends only to ac-
tions which are not merely at the instance of the state government, but
which are specifically compelled by it."' 9 The court held that because
AT&T designed the scheme to impede interconnection of customer
supplied terminal equipment, state agency approval of the challenged
tariff was insufficient grounds to invoke the state action exemption.
Yet, whether the purported reason for denying the exemption is the
absence of a clearly articulated state policy or the absence of state com-
pulsion, the issue is the same: was there a necessary connection be-
tween the state's policy and the defendant's conduct? Although states
pervasively regulate the telephone industry, that regulation does not
require the exclusionary conduct complained of; nor do tariff approvals
received at the initiation of the private defendant broaden a limited
regulatory scheme into a blanket antitrust immunity.
Courts have applied the same analysis to local energy utilities. In
106. 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 1334. The court considered the following factors relevant to the deter-
mination of state action:
[Tihe existence and nature of any relevant statutorily expressed policy; the nature
of the regulatory agency's interpretation and application of its enabling statute,
including the accommodation of competition by the regulator; the fairness of sub-jecting a regulated private defendant to the mandates of antitrust law; and the na-
ture and extent of the state's interest in the specific subject matter of the challenged
activity.
Id
108. 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
109. Id at 958.
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City of Kirkwood v. Union Electric Co., an electricity retailer claimed
it was caught in a price squeeze between defendants' high wholesale
price and lower retail rates. Following Cantor, the Eighth Circuit held
that neither state nor federal legislative policy authorized the chal-
lenged price squeeze.111 Furthermore, neither the state nor the federal
government actively supervised the relationship between federally set
wholesale rates and state set retail rates. Similarly, in Hecht Co. v.
Southern Union Co.,112 a district court held that a challenged conspir-
acy of natural gas producers to fix wellhead prices and simultaneously
raise gas retail rates was not exempt because the state commission
lacked power to regulate wellhead prices and therefore could not have
prevented the alleged price fixing.
1 13
Why the natural monopoly cases denied the state action exemption
from antitrust laws while the associational restraint cases granted it is
not answered easily by Midcal or any other test. It is simplistic to infer
that application of the state action exemption should depend on
whether the challenged conduct is characterized as restraint or monop-
olization. The ambiguities of employing such a test would soon defeat
it. Yet there is some aspect of the state action inquiry that permits
competitors to jointly regulate their competition but prohibits state
regulated firms from individually taking competitive advantage of
others. At the very least, the clear distinction deduced from both sets
of cases proves that the substantive antitrust controversy is critical to
the court's evaluation and application of the state action exemption.
E. The Supervision Requirement
1. In general
The adequate state supervision requirement-part two of the Midcal
test-is a separate criterion for extension of the state action exemption
to the challenged conduct of private parties. Supervision means that
the state or its agent not only requires the challenged conduct but also
oversees it, thereby insuring that allegedly anticompetitive conduct
110. 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
111. Id. at 1180.
112. 474 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.M. 1979).
113. Id. at 1030. See also Winters v. Indiana and Michigan Elec. Co., 1979-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) T 62,797 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (electric utility's acquisition of municipal power
plant was not exempt from claims that it was part of an attempt to monopolize despite
approval by voters and by state regulatory commission because the utility had volunta-
rily initiated the acquisition).
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does not deviate from the scope of the state's authorized displacement
of competition.
Supervision, though a distinct and separate requirement, is interwo-
ven with the policy basis of the state action exemption.114 The require-
ment addresses two distinct concerns rooted in the federalism
principles that gave rise to the state action exemption. First, adequate
state supervision of challenged conduct evidences that it intended to
displace the federal policy of competition with respect to the specific
acts in question. Continuing state oversight of the conduct demon-
strates that the state is pursuing a defined public purpose that requires
regulation in place of unfettered competition. Second, supervision
minimizes the risk that independent private anticompetitive conduct
will be characterized as state action, thereby circumventing federal an-
titrust law and policy. State supervision limits private anticompetitive
conduct to the precise areas in which the state intends to displace com-
petition. Consider the facts in the Supreme Court decision California
Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 5 The respon-
dent wine distributor, Midcal Aluminum, challenged a California stat-
utory scheme for price posting and retail price maintenance in the
wholesale wine trade. Midcal characterized the private price setting
agreements as resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman
Act. The lower California courts concurred, granting Midcal's motion
for an injunction against the enforcement of the state statutes." 6 The
114. A prominent treatise discusses the relationship in the following manner:
The adequate supervision requirement responds directly to the federalism concerns
that are at the core of Parker. It also reflects an attempt to reconcile those con-
cerns with the policies behind the Sherman Act. The basic premise of the antitrust
laws is that the market should both direct and constrain private behavior.... On
the other hand, the antitrust laws provide no basis for distinguishing those areas of
the economy where the market should be allowed to direct economic activity from
those where other concerns warrant public control. The existence of a state action
immunity enables states . . . to define areas inappropriate for market control.
Moreover, the adequate supervision criterion ensures that state-federal conflict will
be avoided in those areas in which the state has demonstrated its commitment to a
program through its exercise of regulatory oversight. At the same time, it guaran-
tees that when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to their own
devices. Rather, immunity will be granted only when the state has substituted its
own supervision for the economic constraints of the competitive market.
AREEDA & TURNER, 1 ANTITRUsT LAW § 213a (1978).
115. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
116. Mideal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1979). Mideal had been charged with violating state statutes by selling wine at less
than prices filed with the Department of Beverage Control. The California Supreme
Court refused to hear an appeal of the lower court ruling.
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Supreme Court, hearing the case on appeal from the California Court
of Appeals, affirmed the injunction. The Court applied the following
two-part test to determine if the price maintenance arrangement was
exempt as state action: "[F]irst the challenged restraint must be 'one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second,
the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the state." '117 The Court
found that the wine pricing scheme satisfied the first part of the test,
but failed to meet the supervision requirement:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices
nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it
regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not mon-
itor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination"
of the program.'""
The federal courts have consistently refused to exempt challenged
private conduct when the active supervision requirement is not met,' 19
and to require active state supervision whenever private conduct is
challenged.' 2° There is a single circumstance in which the active state
supervision requirement is waived with respect to exempting chal-
lenged private conduct-the self-executing statute rule. In Allied Art-
ists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 2 ' plaintiff movie producers and
distributors challenged an Ohio statute that prevented "blind bidding"
by film theatre operators, thus requiring screenings and competitive
bidding procedures. The plaintiffs alleged that this statutory scheme
favored in-state over out-of-state producers and distributors who had
to bear the additional costs of screenings. The Sixth Circuit found that
the state had a valid public purpose in protecting small local operators
against large out-of-state producers and that the challenged statutes
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy to displace
competition. The court also held that in the limited circumstance
where the challenged conduct is a direct extension of state statutory
authority, and where there are no intervening nonstate parties needed
117. 445 U.S. at 105.
118. Id. at 105-06.
119. See, e.g., Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374 (9th
Cir. 1982); Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
120. See, e.g., Gambrel v. Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry, 689 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982); Morgan v. Division of Liquor Con-
trol, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981).
121. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
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for the imposition of the challenged restraint, it would not require ac-
tive state supervision.122 The rationale is transparent: there is neither
any challenged private conduct subject to supervision nor any question
of substantial state involvement.
This analysis leads to the issue of what constitutes adequate state
supervision. The Midcal Court held that the state must "actively" su-
pervise the challenged conduct of private parties and that active super-
vision requires more than simply a state mandate. 123 At least with
respect to state authorized price fixing agreements among private par-
ties, Midcal suggests that the state must at a minimum establish the
prices, review the reasonableness of price schedules, engage in reexami-
nation of the program, or monitor market conditions.1 24
Cases that held exempt state authorized price fixing articulate more
clearly what actions are required for active state supervision. The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control,125 found exempt a
Connecticut statute that mandated minimum liquor price markups at
the wholesale and retail levels and prohibited sales below costs. The
court found adequate state supervision because the state established the
markups after frequent legislative debate. 126
The variation in specific procedures courts find meet the active state
supervision requirement reflects the courts' tendency to determine the
necessary quantum of supervision on a case-by-case basis. Seemingly,
the more egregious the conduct, the more detailed and direct state su-
pervision must be to meet a court's state action exemption standard.
2. Supervision of Municipal Conduct
The question of whether the active state supervision requirement for
122. See id. at 662.
123. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
124. See also Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir.
1982) (price setting practices of beer and wine wholesalers not exempt since state did
not set or review the reasonableness of prices); Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy
Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1982) (state requirements for advance filing of milk
prices challenged as restraining price competition not exempt because state commission
merely enforced privately set prices).
125. 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981).
126. See also Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982) (jockey fee schedules held exempt because set by state
Conimission); Fisher Foods, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. Liquor Control, 555 F. Supp. 641 (N.D.
Ohio 1982) (state regulation that permitted liquor control commission to set minimum
retail markups held to be supervised adequately by commission).
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the state action exemption applies to challenged municipal conduct has
posed a problem for the federal courts. The lower federal courts have
rarely applied the state supervision requirement to municipalities or
subdivisions but instead developed the traditional governmental func-
tions standard whereby challenged municipal acts that constitute func-
tions historically performed by cities do not need to meet the active
state supervision standard. In Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer v.
City of Kansas City,'2 7 the Eighth Circuit held that Kansas City's crea-
tion of a single operator ambulance system, to the exclusion of private
competitors, was state action not subject to Midcal's active supervision
requirement.
The court observed that the Supreme Court had required active state
supervision of challenged anticompetitive activity only when the de-
fendants were private individuals or entities. 128 The court stated that
the political accountability of municipal officials prevented possible
abuse of the authority to engage in anticompetitive activity in a manner
similar to the active state supervision requirement as applied to private
parties. 121
The Supreme Court's recent Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire3 °
decision adopted the Eighth Circuit's Gold Cross Ambulance rationale.
The Court held that the active state supervision requirement does not
apply to municipal conduct. 13 1 The Court stated that there is little dan-
ger that a municipality will engage in price fixing for personal gain. 132
127. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
128. 705 F.2d at 1014-15.
129. Id. The court also stated that "because the Parker doctrine requires that the
state delegate to the local government the authority to engage in the challenged con-
duct, state supervision of Kansas City's conduct is unnecessary to find state action." Id.
See also Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985) (comprehensive state statutory scheme permitted city to
monopolize market for trash collection and energy recycling); Scott v. City of Sioux
City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985) (state delegated
zoning and redevelopment powers to city alleged to have anticompetitively zoned);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1984) (state
policy allowed city to replace competition in taxi business with regulation); Central
Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985) (state legislation affirmatively en-
couraged municipal regulation of trash collection and landfill operation); Campbell v.
City of Phoenix, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,753 (D. Ariz. 1983) (state delegation of
zoning powers).
130. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
131. Id. at 1720-21.
132. Id.
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The Court also noted that the more substantial danger that a munici-
pality will put local interests before state interests is minimized because
it must still act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 133
IV. PECULIAR PROBLEMS OF MUNICIPALITIES
Every municipality exists by virtue of a state charter that grants it
rights and powers. Yet no city can claim its mere status exempts it
from antitrust enforcement. Municipalities occupy a hazy no-man's
land in antitrust law that defies simple categorization. Municipalities
engage in a wide range of conduct that cloud their legal posture. For
example, municipalities employ police (a purely governmental func-
tion), license private development and services (a "mixed" governmen-
tal and proprietary function) and engage directly in the market place as
public service monopolists or competitors. There are additional layers
of complexity because antitrust claims vary greatly, depending upon
whether the defendant is a municipality or a municipally authorized
private party, and upon the nature of the substantive antitrust claim.
These sources of confusion have made anticompetitive municipal con-
duct and regulation one of the most litigated areas of antitrust law in
recent years. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on munici-
pal antitrust liability in Town of Halie v. City of Eau Claire,'34 there-
fore, should be appreciated as the culmination of considerable judicial
analysis.
A. Doctrinal Foundations
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ' and Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. Boulder 36 the Supreme Court defined
what municipal conduct constitutes state action for application of the
state action exemption. In Lafayette, municipally owned electric utili-
ties claimed that the defendant private utility violated antitrust laws.
The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the cities conspired to pre-
empt entry into the market. The district court granted the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the counterclaim, based upon the state action exemp-
tion. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that a trial court must deter-
mine whether the challenged action "was clearly within the legislative
133. Id.
134. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
135. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
136. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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intent," though it need not find an express statutory mandate for the
action to invoke the state action exemption.'
37
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Lafayette plurality 38 adopted the
Fifth Circuit's approach, clearly holding that municipalities do not en-
joy automatic antitrust immunity under the state action exemption.
The Court based its holding upon reasoning in Bates and Goldfarb,
viewing states as sovereign. 139 The Court concluded that for the state
action exemption to apply, challenged anticompetitive municipal con-
duct must be based upon a clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy to displace free competition with regulation or
public monopoly."1° The state mandate, however, need not be specific
or detailed with respect to the particular challenged act.' The Court
found that the state legislation that permitted cities to operate electric
utilities was at best neutral with respect to the challenged conduct, and
held that neutrality was insufficient to meet the clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed standard.142
137. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.
1976).
138. Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part. Justices White and Rehnquist joined in a dissent written by Justice
Stewart. Justice Blackmun also dissented, with a separate opinion.
139. City of Lafayette, 435 US. at 409-12.
140. Id. at 413-17.
141. But see City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320
(N.D. Ind. 1979), affid in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1096
(1981). The district court granted the cities' motion to dismiss a counterclaim on state
action exemption grounds. Defendant, a privately owned electric utility, alleged that
municipally operated utilities attempted to engage in predatory pricing by tying water
and sewage services to their electric utility service. The court distinguished Lafayette
on the grounds that the relevant Indiana statutes specifically enabled municipalities to
operate their own utilities and authorized them to determine which utility services
should be provided publicly.
142. 435 U.S. at 414-15. The Court rejected several arguments put forth by the
plaintiff cities. The Court rejected the argument that cities only exercise power dele-
gated by the state and, therefore, the state action exemption must apply. The Court
observed that this proposition could stand only if the cities were able to demonstrate
"some overriding public policy which negates the construction of [Sherman Act] cover-
age." Id. at 397. The Court identified two sufficiently weighty public policies that
would override the preference for antitrust enforcement-the right to petition govern-
ment and the state action exemption--and concluded that neither applied automatically
to municipalities. Id at 399-400.
The Court also rejected the municipalities' contention that it would be "anamolous to
subject municipalities to the criminal and civil liabilities imposed upon violators of anti-
trust laws," on the grounds that municipalities must comply with other federal laws.
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The Chief Justice, who held the swing vote for the majority, joined
only that part of the Court's opinion that affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
decision and rejected an implied immunity for local governments. He
did not join the plurality's rationale for denying the exemption nor the
standards applied. Rather, the Chief Justice proposed distinguishing
between governmental acts and proprietary enterprises of municipali-
ties.143 Governmental acts should be treated as automatically exempt,
and proprietary enterprises should be treated under the same standards
as privately owned publicly regulated utilities.
Four years later, the Supreme Court ruled in City of Boulder that a
state grant of home rule powers to municipalities was "merely neutral"
with respect to the specific challenged conduct of placing a moratorium
on cable television franchise expansion. Mere neutrality did not consti-
tute a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to dis-
place competition with regulation or monopoly service." The
municipality's challenged act, therefore, could not have been in fur-
therance of a state policy and could not be exempted inferentially as
state action. 145
Id. at 400. Many commentators have criticized the Lafayette decision for having a
potential freezing effect on municipalities by exposing them to treble damages under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. See AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 212.2(a)
(1982 Supp.); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for State Action After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 435 (1981); Bangassee, Exposure of Municipal Corporations to Liability for Viola-
tion of Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity After the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 UR-
BAN LAWYER vii (1979). Stewart, J. raised the same criticism of the plurality's opinion
in his Lafayette dissent. 435 U.S. at 439. These concerns have been mitigated by the
recent passage of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98
Stat. 2750 (1984). The Act provides that neither local governments nor local govern-
ment officials acting in their official capacity can be held liable for damages under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act where the challenged act is taken directly by the local
government or at its direction.
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' "public service" argument that "the antitrust
laws are intended to protect the public only from abuses of private power and not from
actions of municipalities that exist to serve the public use." 435 U.S. at 403. In the
view of the plurality, the municipalities' local interests were too narrow to justify this
rationale. To permit municipalities to have their policies on parochial interests would
weaken antitrust protection and be directly contrary to the national policies of the Sher-
man Act.
143. 435 U.S. at 422.
144. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55.
145. Commentators have criticized the City of Boulder decision for exposing munic-
ipalities to antitrust liability in the exercise of governmental powers. See, e.g., Civiletti,
The Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. Boulder: Prospects for a Legisla.
tive Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379 (1983); Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287 (1982); Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Anti-
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In Boulder, the plaintiff cable television franchisee claimed that a
city ordinance that placed a moratorium on the expansion of cable net-
works "' violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court
granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction and denied the city's mo-
tion to dismiss on state action exemption grounds. The Tenth Circuit
reversed and granted the exemption, reasoning that the municipality's
ordinance was an exercise of home rule powers and represented the
city's active supervision over the cable television market.147 The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Lafayette by asserting that the instant action did
not involve a proprietary function, thereby relying on the Chief Jus-
tice's Lafayette concurrence.14
The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, 49 reversed, reasoning that
the city's action must meet the clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy standard of the Lafayette plurality without regard
to the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions. 50
The Court found that home rule powers upon which the city relied
failed to meet the standard because the state's neutral position, which
allowed municipalities to "do as they please," did not "contemplate"
the specific challenged anticompetitive actions of the city of
Boulder. 151
trust Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 395 (1983); Note, Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: The Emasculation of Municipal Immunity
from Sherman Act Liability, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 413 (1983).
146. Plaintiff's permit had been granted in 1964 by municipal ordinance and had
allowed plaintiff to operate in a limited area of the city. In 1979 plaintiff sought to
expand its business into new areas of the city. The city responded by passing an ordi-
nance placing a moratorium on its expansion for 90 days during which time the city
council would devise a model cable television ordinance and invite new competitors into
the market. The city reasoned that the moratorium was necessary to prevent plaintiff's
expansion from discouraging the entry of new competitors in the municipal market. See
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 43-46.
147. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1980).
148. Id. at 708.
149. Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Lafayette, joined the plurality in Boulder.
The Chief Justice dissented in Boulder. Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opin-
ion in Boulder but did not raise objection to any of the legal points raised in Justice
Brennan's majority opinion. Justice Stevens emphasized that liability and exemption
are separate issues; the nonapplication of the exemption does not automatically result in
municipal liability because the culpability of municipal conduct is a severable issue to be
resolved by the trial courts on the facts of the case. 455 U.S. at 61 (concurring opinion
of Stevens, J.).
150. Id at 54.
151. Id at 55.
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The majority also rejected the argument that a finding of liability
would impair the allocation of power between a state and its subdivi-
sions. The Court declared that state subdivisions must obey antitrust
laws in the absence of state authorization or direction of an anticompe-
titive practice.1 52
The Boulder Court clarified two of the issues left open in Lafayette.
First, the Court rejected the application of the proprietary-governmen-
tal functions distinction proposed by the Chief Justice in Lafayette.
Second, the Court found that a grant of home rule powers to a munici-
pality was merely neutral with respect to the challenged act and did
not constitute an effective use of the state's power to exempt. The
Court did not specify what authorization would be sufficient to claim
the exemption, nor did it consider the possibility that unauthorized
conduct could be wholly without antitrust significance and therefore
per se legal. 153 Boulder left municipalities in an insecure position with
respect to potential antitrust liability for conduct not expressly author-
ized by state statute. In response to City of Boulder, municipalities
pursued several options, including securing specific legislative authori-
zation from the state, finding an alternative state legislation more spe-
cific than home rule as the grounds for the exemption, or asserting that
even broadly gauged state legislation contemplates the challenged an-
ticompetitive act.
B. Municipalities as Licensors and Franchisors
The majority of antitrust claims involving municipalities challenge
the award of a license or a franchise by a municipal authority to a
private party. Usually, the plaintiff is a competitor of the successful
applicant who claims that the award is part of an anticompetitive
scheme. It is important to remember in this context that a municipal-
ity or a private party may enter into a contract for the provision of
services, and thereby deny opportunities to other parties, without vio-
lating the antitrust laws. Tlpsy a municipal award of a license or
152. Id. at 56-57.
153. The city was not a hbrizontal competitor offering its own cable service, nor was
it engaged in an effort to boycott or otherwise exclude plaintiff from the market in a
conspiracy with horizontal competitors. The plaintiff's claim should have been dis-
missed on substantive grounds for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. In short, the city had committed no palpable antitrust wrong. Cities, there-
fore, have to be concerned with defending themselves against antitrust claims even
where the claim, interpreted most fqvxprably for the plaintiff, does not allege facts which
could lead to antitrust culpability.
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franchise to one private party instead of another does not, by itself,
raise any antitrust issues. In considering the volume of recent case law
it is thus imperative that the municipality's allegedly culpable antitrust
conduct be identified. As case law demonstrates, liability lies only
when the municipality enters into an illegal conspiracy. The state ac-
tion doctrine does not protect municipalities that engage in such
conspiracies.
Consider initially Corey v. Look,'54 wherein a parking lot operator
claimed that the defendant steamship authority's termination of the
plaintiff's contract to operate the authority's lot was the consequence of
a conspiracy between the authority and the defendant Town of Fal-
mouth. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants subverted normal
competitive bidding to prevent it from competing and that the town
harassed the plaintiff when it leased alternative parking lot space. The
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on state action
grounds, but the First Circuit reversed, finding that state legislation
empowered the steamship authority to regulate ferry boat competition
but not parking lots, and the town was not expressly authorized to
regulate parking lots. The court did not deny that state legislation au-
thorized the town to own and lease parking lots. The First Circuit
stated, however, that without express statutory language authorizing
the anticompetitive conduct, the town must show "convincing reason-
ing" that the conduct was "necessary" to carry out the state's legisla-
tive scheme.' 55 The court held that state legislation permitting the
town to be a market competitor did not require it to engage in anticom-
petitive conduct. 15 6
Contrast Corey with the most oft-cited municipal licensing case, the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer v. City
of Kansas City."' Kansas City adopted a single-operator ambulance
system concept to follow a "public utility model," thereby excluding all
competition for ambulance services. A Kansas City ordinance creating
the Metropolitan Ambulance Service Trust (MAST), which acquired
all of the outstanding stock, equipment, and licenses of one of the ex-
isting competitive services. MAST thereupon provided ambulance ser-
vice within Kansas City as a utility, without private competitors. The
154. 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
155. Id. at 37.
156. Id.
157. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
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plaintiff challenged the arrangement as unreasonably exclusionary, but
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim.
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the state legislature authorized
the challenged conduct is a vivid example of broad and imaginative
statutory interpretation. The court reasoned that Missouri indicated
an intent to displace unregulated competition when it authorized cities
to provide ambulance services by contracting "with one or more com-
petitors," because monopoly service was the necessary consequence of
having only one municipal ambulance operator.'58 Furthermore, by
requiring all operators and vehicles to be licensed by the state, detailing
the service records which must be kept, and mandating necessary
equipment and insurance, the state could not be merely neutral regard-
ing the operation of ambulance services. Finally, the court held that
state supervision was unnecessary because the state did not authorize
private parties to make anticompetitive decisions. 59
The Eighth Circuit's assemblage of Missouri statutes cannot hide the
fact that none of the legislation leads to the inference that a single oper-
ator system which excluded existing competitors from the market was
necessary to effectuate the state's policy of regulating ambulance serv-
ices for the public health and safety. The statutes authorizing the regu-
lation and licensing of ambulance services assuredly demonstrated a
state decision that unfettered private activity was inappropriate for this
area of vital public concern. The legislation, however, indicates only
that the state gave cities a wide range of options to provide ambulance
services. It did not specifically contemplate the replacement of all
competition by a utility model.
The Ninth Circuit has cited Gold Cross favorably in three municipal
licensing cases. In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles' 6°
a cab company unsuccessfully claimed that a city and other cab com-
panies conspired to deprive the plaintiff a license renewal. The city
argued it denied the renewal because the plaintiff failed to file required
papers, and argued that it was therefore exempt because the California
Public Utilities Code authorizes city regulation of cab companies. Sim-
158. Id. at 1013.
159. Accord All American Cab Co. v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547
F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), affid mer., 732 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1983) ("public
service and public necessity" statutory language sufficed to exempt airport authority
from antitrust challenge for maintaining an exclusive taxi cab dispatch service with one
company).
160. 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1984).
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ilarly, in Catalina Cablevision Associates v. City of Tuscon,16 1 the Ninth
Circuit upheld the city's grant of an exclusive cable television
franchise. The court held that specific statutory authorization for cities
to regulate construction, operation, and maintenance of cable television
systems constituted an affirmative expression of a state policy to dis-
place unfettered private activity. 162 Finally, in Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 163 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
statutory articulation of a policy to regulate cable franchising even
though the state statute merely permitted, rather than compelled, an-
ticompetitive franchising.
Other courts have not been as obedient to Gold Cross as the Ninth
Circuit. In Campbell v. City of Chicago,'" the district court refused to
exempt a challenged agreement between the city and two taxicab com-
panies, whereby the two cab companies secured binding agreements to
receive a specified number of cab licenses in perpetuity in exchange for
withdrawing lawsuits against the city. The plaintiffs alleged a conspir-
acy between the two cab companies to control licenses and to secure a
municipal ordinance that froze the number of licenses. The court ap-
plied Lafayette's "reasonable and necessary consequences of engaging
in the authorized activity" standard and concluded: "The statute at
issue in this case authorizes the licensing and regulation of taxicabs,
but it nowhere sanctions the creation of a set of private rights that are
perpetually binding on the city."' 165 Similarly, in Springs Ambulance
Service, Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage,166 the district court declined to
bar an antitrust claim based upon municipal refusal to refer emergency
calls to plaintiff private ambulance services, conspiracy to fix ambu-
lance service rates and predatory pricing of such services. The court
held that the state's regulation of ambulance services did not demon-
strate an intent to displace competition completely but rather to create
a responsive system. Such regulation did not encompass price fixing or
predation.
161. 745 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1984).
162. It is arguable that in neither Golden State nor Catalina the plaintiff presented a
viable antitrust claim. Neither case involved an allegation of an illegal conspiracy,
plaintiffs simply challenged the grant of a franchise. Absent a claim of conspiracy, the
choice of one bidder over another would not seem to raise an antitrust issue.
163. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. 577 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
165. Id. at 1174.
166. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,646 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd in part, 745 F.2d
1270 (9th Cir. 1984).
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This brief review of the recent litigation involving municipal licens-
ing pursuant to general grants of state delegated authority indicates
considerable inconsistency regarding whether the challenged conduct
must necessarily be derived from a state regulatory policy or only rea-
sonably contemplated by that policy. This inconsistency must be ap-
preciated in the context of a number of disputes that have been barred
even though plaintiff's claim lacked substantive antitrust merit. Thus,
it is not clear whether the Gold Cross line of cases derive from a judicial
effort to prevent antitrust liability from attaching to municipalities or
simply reflects the employment of the state action exemption to dismiss
a meritless claim. It is clear that the law's hostility to conspiracy, as
reflected in Corey and Campbell, will not be defeated by an open-ended
application of Gold Cross. Nevertheless, the ambiguity in these cases
creates the risk that culpable antitrust conduct will be exempted be-
cause of a vague state judgment that a legitimate public purpose should
constrain free competition.
C. Municipalities as Zoners and Controllers of Land Development
A common municipal function is to regulate land development
through the use of zoning powers. While state delegation of land use
authority to municipalities protects legitimate use of zoning powers,
courts have held that sham manipulation of the zoning process is sub-
ject to antitrust enforcement. 167 Recent decisions split evenly on appli-
cation of the state action exemption to zoning.
In Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,61 a shopping
mall developer alleged that a city, its officials and the developer of a
competing mall conspired to prevent the plaintiff's commercial devel-
opment. The city zoned the plaintiff's property for commercial use but
changed the classification to noncommercial use, allegedly at the insti-
gation of the defendant competing developer. Concurrently, the de-
fendant developer received commitments from city officials for zoning
modifications to permit mall development prior to the official adoption
of those modifications by the appropriate authorities. The district
167. The court in Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. I11. 199I), stated as
follows:
[S]tatutes that permit a municipality to redevelop property within its boundaries do
not in any way suggest that the State of Illinois has authorized, let alone compelled,
a municipality and its officials to violate the federal antitrust laws by passing a
"sham" redevelopment plan to further a conspiracy with private developers.
Id. at 776.
168. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
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court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on state action
grounds,' 69 but the Eighth Circuit reversed.' 7 °
The Eighth Circuit held that a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of
their property rights through manipulation of the zoning process did
not further any clearly articulated state purpose and therefore did not
merit exemption. The primary purpose of zoning powers is to control
land use for the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the commu-
nity. In Westborough, however, the alleged purpose of the conspiracy
was to favor the interests of one private developer against those of a
competitor. The court found that the city had acted beyond its legiti-
mate authority to regulate land use and engaged in conduct culpable
under antitrust laws. 7 ' No valid state purpose existed to exempt such
conduct.'
72
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit applied the state action exemption
on facts similar to Westborough in Scott v. City of Sioux City.171 Prop-
erty owners near the city limits of Sioux City challenged the city coun-
cil's passage of zoning ordinances preventing commercial development
of their property. The plaintiffs claimed that the ordinances arose from
a conspiracy between a downtown developer and members of the city
council designed to restrain trade and monopolize shopping center de-
velopment. In 1966 the city zoned the plaintiffs land for commercial
development. Nearly simultaneously, the city prepared an urban re-
newal plan that included a central business district shopping center. In
1974 the city entered into a contract with defendant Metro Center to
develop a shopping center, and shortly thereafter sold additional prop-
erty to the plaintiffs, announcing that plaintiffs would construct a re-
gional shopping mall on the site. Metro Center expressed concern
about competing for tenants with plaintiff's mall. The city council im-
169. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 532 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Mo. 1981).
170. Westborough Mall, 693 F.2d at 746.
171. See also Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lane, 198 1-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029
(D. Colo. 1980) (state delegated zoning authority contemplated displacement of compe-
tition with regulation, but not alleged conduct of defendants); Mason City Center Ass'n
v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (city not automatically exempt from
Sherman Act when it exercised state delegated zoning powers to allegedly enter an-
ticompetitive agreement with private developers).
172. But see Campbell v. City of Phoenix, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q 65,753 (D.
Ariz. 1983) (liability of city does not rest on the effectiveness of its policy).
173. 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
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mediately thereafter rezoned plaintiffs' property in a classification that
did not allow commercial development.
Holding that the defendants' acts were exempt as state action, 174 the
Eighth Circuit noted: "[T]he state policy to displace competition can
be inferred if the challenged restraint is a necessary and reasonable
consequence of engaging in the authorized activity."' 175  The court
found authorization for zoning and land use controls in the Iowa Ur-
ban Renewal Law, which provided that cities may do "any and all
things to carry out and effectuate" their urban renewal plans. 176 The
court reasoned that the broad grant of authority, the significance of
central business district renewal and the city's financial involvement in
the project made the rezoning of plaintiffs' property a "necessary and
reasonable consequence" of the state's authorization. Therefore, both
the municipal and private defendants' conduct were beyond the reach
of antitrust law. The court left open the issue of whether a city council
could act beyond the scope of its authority and enter into agreements
with private developers in restraint of trade in violation of the federal
antitrust laws, holding that the facts did not present that issue. '
77
The zoning cases demonstrate that the federal courts are unlikely to
grant the state action exemption on the basis of a city's exercise of
general governmental powers without the presence of additional state
statutory authority. The additional statutory authority does not, how-
ever, have to establish that the challenged act was necessary to effectu-
ate the statute. Rather, the courts have cited the additional authority
either to override the Boulder "mere neutrality" limitation, or to find a
general state sanction for the area of activity affected by the challenged
conduct, thereby endowing the challenged act with a state purpose.
D. Municipalities as Providers of Public Services
In voluminous recent litigation, municipal defendants proferred the
state action exemption as a bar to claims that, as market participants,
174. The case had a complex litigation history. The district court originally rejected
application of the exemption, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,352 (N.D. Iowa 1983), but
reconsidered, in light of Gold Cross, and granted the exemption, 1983-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 9 65,589 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
175. 736 F.2d at 1211. See also Reasor v. City of Norfolk, 606 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.
Va. 1984) (legislature contemplated allegedly anticompetitive activities of city when it
authorized city to finance a redevelopment authority to undertake activities private en-
terprise refused to do without assistance).
176. 736 F.2d at 1212.
177. Id. at 1215.
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they committed exclusionary acts against private parties or political
subdivisions. The challenged conduct is not municipal regulation of
private commercial activity within municipal borders but commercial
activity in markets beyond municipal borders. The courts have had no
difficulty in refusing to exempt the conduct of a municipal enterprise
merely because of its governmental status.178 A more difficult issue is
presented, however, when a municipality claims the exemption because
it seeks to provide a public service. Four cases prior to Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire179 raised this issue, and the opinions provide a
framework for interpreting the Hallie decision.
In Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines,180 the Eighth
Circuit held that the state action exemption applied to acts of a metro-
politan area solid waste agency that directly prevented the operation of
competitive landfills. The defendant solid waste agency was a coopera-
tive venture of fifteen municipalities formed under Iowa law to operate
a single solid waste disposal facility. The intergovernmental agreement
stipulated that no other solid waste disposal sites would be licensed by
the member municipalities during the period that revenue bonds, is-
sued for purposes of constructing the facility, were outstanding. A pri-
vate solid waste landfill operator claimed that the denial of operating
licenses constituted exclusionary conduct violating antitrust laws. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on state action
exemption grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Eighth Circuit
stated that while state statutory authority did not expressly indicate an
intent to displace competition in the area of solid waste disposal, a
"comprehensive legislative scheme" encouraging municipalities to con-
struct sanitary landfills and requiring counties and municipalities to
provide environmentally safe disposal was sufficient to infer the requi-
site state intent.18 The court concluded that restrained competition
was a "necessary and reasonable consequence" of building a waste dis-
posal facility under the state scheme.182
In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron,183 on facts remarkably similar
178. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
See also Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.
Cal. 1981).
179. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
180. 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 427.
182. Id.
183. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985).
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to Des Moines, the Sixth Circuit held exempt the challenged acts of a
municipality aimed at securing financing for a solid waste energy re-
cycling plant. A licensed hauler of waste in Akron challenged a mu-
nicipal ordinance that required all rubbish collected in the City of
Akron to be deposited at the municipal recycle energy system facility
(RES) for a "tipping fee" set by the city's public service director.
Trash haulers failing to comply faced both loss of their license and
criminal prosecution. The plaintiff contended that the ordinance elimi-
nated competition among disposal sites, prohibited haulers from seek-
ing lower tipping fees and restrained haulers' business in selling
recyclable materials. The district court granted the defendants', the
city and the Ohio Water Development Agency (OWDA), motion to
dismiss the antitrust claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit found statutory authorization for municipalities to
engage in solid waste disposal, and construction of solid waste facili-
ties. Also, the state authorized OWDA to regulate and finance solid
waste disposal, to enter into cooperative agreements with municipali-
ties and to do all acts necessary or proper to carry out its express
power. 184 Furthermore, Akron enacted the challenged municipal ordi-
nance as a function of its cooperative agreement with OWDA to insure
the marketing of revenue bonds for the construction of RES. The
court expressly rejected the district court's conclusion that state legisla-
tion governing OWDA provided the requisite "clear articulation and
affirmative expression" of state policy to extend the exemption to the
municipality.185 The court of appeals, however, held that delegation of
regulatory power to Akron, in combination with the "powers and
aims" of OWDA constituted a clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed policy to displace competition.'1 6 Thus, the challenged con-
duct of both the agency and the municipality were necessary inferences
of the legitimate state purposes to regulate solid waste disposal and to
promote the construction of solid waste facilities. The financial inabil-
ity to construct RES without the challenged restraint reinforced the
inference that the restraints were in furtherance of state policy to dis-
place competition.' 87
184. Id. at 962.
185. Id. at 961.
186. Id. at 962.
187. Accord Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 426 (1983). In City of Pueblo the defendant municipality owned
and operated a municipal airport. The plaintiff, a fixed base operator providing services
such as aircraft refueling and maintenance and lessee of facilities from the city, chal-
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Both Des Moines and Akron involved the total displacement of com-
petition by a publicly-owned monopoly in an enterprise that demanded
the centralization of local facilities. Although the defendants in both
cases directly entered the marketplace as commercial participants, the
purpose of their entry required a unified effort under public control. In
this regard, both municipalities functioned in a manner analogous to
regional planning authorities, and the elimination of competition was
necessarily ancillary to their public purpose. Similarly, in City of North
Olmsted v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 8' a munici-
pality alleged that a county transit authority (GCRTA) attempted to
monopolize public transportation by refusing to permit federal trans-
portation subsidies to flow to a parallel bus line operated by the city.
The state empowered the defendant GCRTA to operate public trans-
portation as a state subdivision. The GCRTA entered into an agree-
ment with the City of North Olmsted whereby the authority financially
assisted city operation of parallel bus lines. The agreement remained in
effect for five years after which the GCRTA refused to extend it and
discontinued subsidies. The city claimed that these actions by the
GCRTA constituted an attempt to monopolize public transportation in
the county. The defendant moved for summary judgment on state ac-
tion exemption grounds. The district court found that the GCRTA
acted pursuant to state legislation in which the legislature had "...
contemplated the conduct about which North Olmsted com-
plained,"' 9 and granted the defendant's motion. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, relying on state court construction of the general Ohio statute
permitting formation of regional transit authorities." 9 The Ohio
courts interpreted the statute to create a duty for GCRTA to provide
county-wide transportation, and no duty to continue its agreement
with North Olmsted. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the challenged
lenged the acts of the city and other fixed base operators leading to the failure to renew
plaintiff's lease upon its expiration and granting plaintiff's lease to another fixed base
operator under a bidding procedure. The defendants moved for dismissal on grounds of
state action exemption and for failure to state a genuine claim against noncity defend-
ants. The district court granted the motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "Here, the
Colorado legislature... has expressly declared the operation of airport facilities '.. . to
be public governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
necessity.'" 679 F.2d at 811. This language, in the view of the Tenth Circuit, was
sufficient to establish that the operation of the airport was not a proprietary function,
and the language of the statute contemplated the challenged municipal conduct.
188. 722 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).
189. See 722 F.2d at 1286.
190. Id. at 1288.
19851
Washington University Open Scholarship
128 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:83
actions of GCRTA were "contemplated and authorized" by state law
and constituted acts of a state subdivision in furtherance of an affirma-
tively expressed state policy.191 The court, therefore, found that exclu-
sion of competition was a necessary consequence of successfully
operating a county-wide transit system.
North Olmsted helps explain Des Moines and Akron, and the three
cases stand for the proposition that area-wide consolidation of services
pursuant to a legitimate state policy authorizing public provision of
such services is exempt as state action. A more difficult issue arises,
however, when the municipality's challenged act is not the regional
replacement of competition with a public service, but the use of munic-
ipal power to exclude competition. In Parks v. Watson,192 a geother-
mal well owner requested that the defendant city vacate streets so an
apartment complex could be developed to use its surplus energy. The
city stated it would deny the request unless the owner dedicated the
land and the wells to the city. The well owner charged that the city's
refusal to vacate for reasonable compensation foreclosed it from devel-
oping the land or competing in the geothermal heating market. The
city claimed state action immunity, based on an Oregon statute author-
izing public ownership of geothermal resources. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Ninth Circuit
remanded for trial. The court stated that for a defendant to claim the
state action exemption it must demonstrate that the legislature contem-
plated not only a state policy to displace competition, but also the
"kind of action complained of."19
The Ninth Circuit, in Parks v. Watson, indicated that there may be a
limit to the Des Moines-Akron-North Olmstead holdings favoring mu-
nicipal or regional consolidation of "natural monopoly" functions. In
Parks, unlike the other cases, there was no economic or public purpose
to be achieved by the exclusionary activity. Indeed, because the munic-
ipal conduct was not minimally ancillary to its authorized interests, the
city could not claim the state action immunity. When a municipal pro-
vision of public services is challenged as anticompetitive it is therefore
critical to assess whether the exclusionary conduct is merely the conse-
quence of pursuing legitimate public interests or is a deliberate and
191. Id.
192. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
193. Id. at 663. Cf Lockary v. Koyfeta, 587 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (com-
prehensive state statutory policy specifically granted defendants authority to impose the
complained of moratorium on extension of water lines during a "water emergency").
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unjustified use of market power for the primary purpose of augmenting
that power. That assessment turns partially upon the scope of author-
ity delegated to the municipality in question.
In Hattie, four Wisconsin townships adjacent to the defendant city of
Eau Claire challenged the city's refusal to deliver sewage treatment
services to the townships unless they agreed to annexation by the city.
The townships contended that the city monopoly of sewage treatment
in effect excluded them from the market for sewage collection and
transportation, leaving them no means of disposing of sewage once col-
lected. The district court granted the city's motion to dismiss Sherman
Act claims on state action grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.194
The court examined a state statutory scheme that, on similar facts,
state courts held exempted municipal actions from antitrust laws. The
court held that state policy clearly contemplated the actions of the City
of Eau Claire.'95 State statutes expressly permitted cities to deny sew-
age treatment services to towns that refused to become annexed by the
city. Furthermore, the court found that the state policy evidenced an
intent to displace competition with monopoly public service or regula-
tion. The court stated that the requisite state intent was inferable from
the state's general authorization provision for municipal sewage treat-
ment service, and more specific statutory authority permitting a city to
deny requests to extend service.'
9 6
The Supreme Court affirmed. 19 7 The Court held that although a
state may not validate anticompetitive municipal conduct by simply
declaring it lawful, the state action exemption applies to conduct per-
mitted by a clearly expressed state policy that contemplates anticompe-
titive conduct.' The Court rejected the townships' contention that
the state action exemption applies only to anticompetitive municipal
conduct expressly contemplated by a state.'99 The Court stated that in
Hallie it was "sufficient" that Wisconsin authorized the city to deter-
mine where it would provide sewage treatment services." ° The Court
held that the Wisconsin scheme clearly contemplated anticompetitive
194. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983).
195. Id. at 383.
196. Id at 381.
197. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
198. Id. at 1718.
,99. Id. at 17!9.
200. Id.
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effects from municipal actions under it.20 1 Anticompetitive effects
were a "forseeable" and "logical" result of the broad state grant of
authority to regulate sewage treatment services.202
Hallie is the leading decision in a growing body of case law concern-
ing the interaction among municipalities as competing participants in
economic markets. In the context of state authorization for refusals to
extend sewage treatment services to unannexed towns, allegations that
such a refusal is anticompetitive are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. It
is not relevant that the defendants pursued an anticompetitive motive
that was not expressly approved. The issue turns on neither motive nor
effect, but upon the nature of the challenged conduct as within or
outside the reasonable contemplation of the state authorization. As in-
dicated earlier, Hallie does not change the law-it does not permit mu-
nicipalities to engage in unauthorized anticompetitive activity. In
addition, Httallie does not change the criteria for distinguishing exempt
from nonexempt conduct, although it does clarify and focus the analy-
sis exclusively on the scope of state authorization.
V. CONCLUSION
In policy terms, the state action exemption is the accommodation of
antitrust law to the sovereign power of states in the American federal
system. In functional terms, the exemption bars antitrust scrutiny of
state regulation of commercial activity. In addition, the exemption is
functionally an affirmative defense asserted by private parties to shield
anticompetitive conduct from antitrust enforcement.
Doctrinally, the exemption is analyzed by the two-part Midcat test-
clear articulation plus active state supervision. The simplicity of the
Midcat test masks the complexities of its application. Nonetheless, the
federal courts have developed consistent standards through which to
resolve the widely varied assertions of the exemption. In so doing, the
courts focused on the authorizing act of the state, the nature of the
challenged conduct and the relationship between the conduct and the
authorization. The result is an analytical approach fully demonstrative
of the rule of reason.
The doctrinal fundamentals are remarkably clear and concise. Only
the state, in its sovereign capacity, can authorize anticompetitive con-





tive expression of the state's intent to displace competition ancillary to
a valid state purpose. The "reasonable contemplation test," alluded to
in Lafayette and articulated in Hallie, suggests limits to the "clear ar-
ticulation" component of the Midcal test. Authorization presupposes
delegation, which is required as a matter of practicality, in nearly all
cases, for the sovereign's passive authorization to become active regula-
tion, but delegation can never broaden the scope of the sovereign's au-
thorization. Supervision, the second prong of the Midcal test, now
clearly applicable only to private parties, is a preventative mechanism
against the possible abuse of the exemption by private parties who
might otherwise masquerade culpable conduct as exempt state action.
Southern Motor Carriers and Hallie clarify specific issues without
disturbing established doctrine. The Court held in Southern Motor
Carriers that compulsion of a private party's challenged conduct is not
a separate requirement; rather, it is evidence of authorization not
needed when the state's action is facially clear. Hence, state authoriza-
tion that clearly permits, but does not compel, the challenged private
conduct meets the first prong of Midcal. .- allie resolves the issue of
whether supervision of challenged municipal conduct is required; it is
not. This holding recognizes the unique status of a municipality as a
public entity infused with a public purpose, however parochial it may
be. The same recognition is reflected in the Court's requirement of a
lesser degree of specificity in the state's articulation of policy in order
to exempt municipal conduct due to the lower risks of abuse of the
exemption. Nonetheless, authorization must be present.
That neither Southern Motor Carriers nor Hallie substantially
change prior doctrine is the source of their significance. These newest
Supreme Court additions to the state action exemption doctrine further
demonstrate its evolutionary character and the capacity of the antitrust
courts to resolve exceedingly complex issues by retaining a disciplined
analytical focus on the rule of reason.
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